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1. Different Forms of Parenthood in History and a Brave New 
Framework
In the history of human societies, the concept of parenthood has changed 
many times. We cannot follow each and every step, but we have to remind the 
most important ones.
Amongst some primitive peoples, parenthood was communal: all the mem-
bers of the tribe were considered “parents” of the children. In fact, there was no 
knowledge about the functioning of human reproduction1 and, in any case, the 
practise of sexual promiscuity, or at least of polyandry, made it almost impossible 
to ascertain paternity2. 
On the other hand, after the introduction of monogamy3, or at least of poly- 
gyny, with the possibility of control and repression against female adultery, it be-
came also possible to presume paternity from birth in the wedlock4. Such a legal 
presumption of parenthood was often shaped as very difficult to be contradict-
ed, in order to avoid uncertainties and the related abuses5. Therefore, children 
were classified as legitimate if born in the wedlock and so endowed with a fully 
1 Our remote ancestors did not know that fertilization depends on sexual intercourse and supposed 
that women became pregnant because of the action of ghosts and/or natural forces. Some traces of these 
ideas can be found in classical mythology (see Hartland, Edwin Sidney, 1909, Primitive Paternity. The Myth 
of Supernatural Birth in Relation to the History of the Family, Nutt, London), but similar beliefs have been 
reported also by anthropologists in more recent times (see Malinowski, Bronislaw, 1913, The Family among 
the Australian Aborigines, University of London Press, London; Malinowski, Bronislaw, 1932, The Sexual 
Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia, Routledge, London).
2 According to the historian Theopompus of Chios (in Müller, karl, 1841, Fragmenta Historicorum 
Graecorum, Didot, Paris, I, p. 315, fragm. 222), the most ancient inhabitants of Italy were used to «κοινὰς 
ὑπάρχειν τὰς γυναίκας» and therefore «τρέφειν… πάντα τὰ γινόμενα παιδία, οὐκ εἰδότας ὅτου πατρός ἐστιν 
ἕκαστος». For other accounts from classical sources, see also Franciosi, Gennaro, 1978, Clan gentilizio e 
strutture monogamiche. Contributo alla storia della famiglia romana, Jovene, Naples, 1978, and Piasere, 
Leonardo, 2008, “La terminologia di parentela degli uomini giusti”, Quaderni del ramo d’oro online, 1, pp. 
13-23. But in modern-day Amazonia some indigenous peoples still consider all the husbands of a polyan-
drous woman as fathers of all her children, believing that fertilization implies a mixture of their sperms in her 
womb (see BeckerMan, Stephen, Valentine, Paul, 2002, Cultures of multiple fathers: The theory and practice 
of partible paternity in lowland South America, University Press of Florida, Gainesville).
3 According to one of the various mythical accounts of this passage, Cecrops, king of Athens, “discov-
ered” that procreation depends not only on women but also on the male contribution provided through sex-
ual intercourse, and so he decided to introduce monogamy, abolishing the previous practice of “κοινογάμια”, 
as well as to disenfranchise women (see atHenaeus, deiPnosoPHistae, 13, 555c-555d).
4 The rule is expressed by the famous Roman law maxim: “pater vero is est, quem nuptiae demons- 
trant” (Digesta Iustiniani, 2.4.5).
5 E.g., according to the Napoleonic Code, the husband of the mother was legally presumed to be the 
father, and he could deny his paternity only by proving the physical impossibility of cohabitation or the wife’s 
adultery (articles 312 and 316), while investigations meant to demonstrate natural paternity outside wed-
lock were prohibited (article 340), with a limited exception intended to punish the perpetrator of a rape, so 
that in general terms the illegitimate children could be recognized only through a free act of will of the father.
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recognized status, or illegitimate, if born out of wedlock and so endowed with 
limited and uncertain rights, or no rights at all.
In today’s societies the situation is totally different: Parenthood can be easily 
certified through DNA testing (except for some quite rare cases, such as natural 
chimerism6), the legal differences between children born in or outside wedlock 
have been abolished7, and so genetics is considered as the essential ground of 
filiation8.
On the other hand, parenthood may be merely social and intentional, when 
based on adoption, as happened since ancient times, or on the de facto rela-
tionship involving, e.g., the child of a cohabitant partner, but also, in our times of 
widespread use of assisted reproductive technologies, on the informed consent 
to heterologous fertilization, or even to gestational surrogacy.
Regardless of all these possible concepts of legal parenthood, the genetic 
parental relation has always been unique: one male genetic father and one fe-
male genetic mother, pursuant to the unescapable mechanisms of human sex-
ual reproduction.
Therefore, until our days a legal order had in substance “only” to decide 
whether to recognize genetic parenthood as legal parenthood or not. And, in 
fact, in some cases that recognition could be denied, in order to punish the 
6 Congenital tetragametic chimerism occurs when two separate ova are fertilized by two sperms, but 
the two embryos are then merged at the blastocyst or zygote stage, originating an embryo with two gen-
otypes. In other words, natural chimeras derive from the spontaneous merging of two non-identical twins. 
Thus, a chimeric person may have an organ composed of cells with one set of chromosomes and another 
organ composed of cells with a second, different set of chromosomes. The consequent difference in phe-
notypes can turn out to be undetectable, or quite subtle (e.g., eyes of different colors, as in the historical 
case of Alexander the Great), or even impressive (as some cases of intersexuality), but chimerism is prob-
lematic for DNA testing. In fact, the child of a chimera inherits only one of the parent’s genotypes and so, 
if the test is performed with regard to the parent’s cells marked by the other one, it will show no parental 
relations. In some American cases, chimeric women were initially suspected of not being the biological 
mothers of their children after DNA testing, and so they were charged with fraud while the custody of their 
children was challenged, but the charges were finally dismissed when chimerism was detected and the 
matching DNA was found in other tissues of the concerned woman (see Yu, Neng et al., 2002, “Disputed 
Maternity Leading to Identification of Tetragametic Chimerism”, New England Journal of Medicine. 346 (20), 
pp. 1545-1552; norton, Aaron, ZeHner, Ozzie, 2008, “Which Half Is Mommy?: Tetragametic Chimerism 
and Trans-Subjectivity”, Women’s Studies Quarterly, pp. 106-127; GranZen, Robert, 2014, “The Human 
Chimera: Legal Problems Arising from Individuals with Multiple Types of DNA”, Law School Student Schol-
arship, Seton Hall University, n. 485).
7 sinGer, Anna, 2016, “Sweden”, in A., BücHler, H., Keller (eds.), Family Forms and Parenthood, In-
tersentia, Cambridge-Antwerp, p. 432, has realistically noted that the reforms that recognized rights and 
full equality to children born outside of wedlock became only possible once genetics had provided new 
certainties that had been unconceivable in the past.
8 See Hendricks, Jennifer, 2016 “Genetic Essentialism in Family Law”, Health Matrix, 1, pp. 109-122; 
Douglas, Thomas, deVolder, Katrien, 2018, “A conception of genetic parenthood”, Bioethics, 23rd July, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12493.
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genetic parent’s misconduct, e.g., in the cases of adultery or incest, or, all back-
wards, in order to respect the genetic parent’s protected choice for abandoning 
and/or for anonymity, e.g., in the cases of baby hatches or gamete donations. 
But nowadays some new emerging genetic and reproductive biotechnolo-
gies are totally reshaping the framework.
The most remarkable among the forthcoming cases are the following:
– Genetic parents could be more or less than two.
– A person could have no genetic parents at all.
– Genetic parents could be two, but both females or both males.
These radical transformations pose also a lot of brand-new problems to 
family law, that the present paper will try to discuss. But, first of all, we have 
to specify that the discussion will focus on the private law perspective of the 
possible new, or maybe revised, legal concepts of parenthood, and not on the 
different question whether to allow or to prohibit the use of the discussed tech-
nologies, with regard to general policy reasons, ethical concerns, etc.
Indeed, in the light of the experience of other reproductive assisted technol-
ogies, the most probable hypothesis is that also some of the new technologies 
will be allowed in some countries and not in others and vice versa, and that, in 
any case, people will find ways to use them through reproductive tourism, or 
directly infringing their domestic criminal law. Therefore, persons will come into 
the world because of the use of these technologies and the main problem for 
private lawyers will not be if and how to punish who applied the techniques, but 
if and how to recognise the status of these children.
2. Parthenogenesis: Children with One Genetic Parent
Parthenogenesis (from Greek παρθένος=virgin and γένεσις=birth) means the 
development of an embryo from an unfertilized egg cell. It is just the natural 
form of asexual reproduction of some vegetal and animal species, occurring 
also among vertebrates9. But today scientists are already able to apply it to hu-
man oocytes, artificially stimulating them in order to create embryos for research 
purposes10.
9 In some plants also androgenesis (i.e., development of an embryo from a male gamete alone) may 
occur: See Silvertown, Jonathan, 2009, An Orchard Invisible. A Natural History of Seeds, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 26-29. However, parthenogenesis is much more widespread in nature. 
10 Indeed, even before these technical achievements, rare spontaneous processes of development from 
unfertilized human oocytes have always been possible, but in nature they produce a tumorous mass and not an 
embryo. See kiesselinG, Ann, 2004, “What is an Embryo?”, Connecticut Law Review, p. 1051 et seq.; Findlay, 
John, et al., 2007, “Human Embryo: A Biological Definition”, Human Reproduction, 2007, p. 905 et seq.
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Therefore, the so-called parthenotes, i.e., embryos produced through par-
thenogenesis, have only one, necessarily female, genetic parent.
The first legal question to be answered is whether these embryos, with such 
a peculiar genetic parenthood, have to be considered wholly human embryos 
or not.
According to the most recent European case-law, a parthenote does not 
fall within the definition of human embryo, because it “commences a process 
of development”, but lacks the “inherent capacity of developing into a human 
being” without additional manipulations11. Therefore, the use of parthenotes for 
research purposes is not subject to the rules and restrictions concerning human 
embryos, and more specifically it is patentable.
But it is quite a questionable decision. Indeed, we can agree that parthe-
notes at the moment have no possibilities to grow up into adults, and so have to 
be considered not viable, as many other embryos affected by severe diseases 
are, but this does not necessarily imply that they are not human. Moreover, we 
have to note that scientists are already able to develop some mouse parthenotes 
into normal mice12, and maybe in the future this will also be possible for human 
parthenotes.
More generally speaking, in our new framework, it would be potentially very 
dangerous to deny humanhood to all the products of reproductive processes 
that do not follow the paths of traditional genetic parenthood. What will happen 
if and when a parthenote has developed into a new-born baby? Would he/she 
be considered less human than any other baby?
Passing to a family law perspective, such a child would have only one, ge-
netic as well as legal, parent: i.e., the mother. But, from a merely juridical point 
of view, such an outcome will be not so different from the situation already de-
termined by those legal orders allowing anonymous heterologous fertilization for 
11 With this motivation the EU Court of Justice, 18th December 2014, C-364/2013, Comptroller, has 
reversed the precedent of EU Court of Justice, 18th October 2011, C-34/10, Brustle, that had considered 
parthenotes as human embryos. Moreover, also one of the first American regulations on that issue, the so-
called Dickey Wicker Amendment of 1995, had included the products of parthenogenesis in its definition of 
the human embryo to be protected. With regard to the last EU Court of Justice decision, see also for further 
references, roMano, Rosaria, 2015, “Certezza del diritto, incertezza della scienza”, Nuova giurisprudenza 
civile commentata, 2015, pp. 258 et seq.; Penasa, Simone, 2015, “La Corte di giustizia e la ri-definizione 
normativa di embrione umano”, Quaderni costituzionali, pp. 213 et seq.).
12 See suZuki, Toru et al., 2016, “Mice produced by mitotic reprogramming of sperm injected into haploid 
parthenogenotes”, Nature Communications, 12676, 13th September. Indeed, this procedure implied the 
use of sperms, and so we could say that parthenotes have been “fertilized”.
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single women, or post mortem fertilization for widows13. Anyway, the child could 
always be adopted by the mother’s spouse or partner, according to the ordinary 
rules on filiation.
3. Genome Editing: Children without Genetic Parents
Genome editing is a genetic engineering technique in which DNA could be 
inserted, deleted, modified or replaced in the genome of a living organism. Sci-
entific research in this field, aiming above all at eradicating genetic diseases, 
dates back to the Seventies14, but nowadays the new technology of the so-
called “CRISPR-Cas9” system has made gene editing much more precise and 
efficient.
In 2015 Chinese scientists tested genome editing on human embryos for 
research purposes, and then destroyed them15, and in 2018, after a very con-
troversial experimentation two Chinese twins were reportedly born from CRIS-
PR-Cas9 edited embryos16. In any case, according to many scholars, such a 
birth probably it is just a matter of time17.
13 In the European context, with regard to post mortem fertilization of widows, we can mention the 
examples of both Spain (Ley, 26th May 2006, n. 14, article 9) and Greece (Αστικός Κώδικας, article 1457). 
Indeed, we have to specify that in the case of anonymous heterologous fertilization for single women the 
only legal parent of the child is his/her mother, while in the case of post mortem fertilization he/she can also 
be legally considered as a child of the deceased father, e.g., for inheritance purposes.
14 We have to mention at least the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA of 1975, where the po-
tential biohazards were discussed and guidelines were elaborated.
15 See lianG, Puping et al., 2015, “CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing in human tripronuclear zy-
gotes”, Protein & Cells, 5, pp. 363-372. CRISPR stands for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindro-
mic repeats”, while Cas9 is a protein.
16 He Jiankui claimed to be the author of the experiment that had made the newborn girls genetically 
resistant to HIV, by disabling the gene for a protein called CCR5, but it is possible that deleting CCR5 
enhanced also their cognitive abilities (see silVa, Alcino et al., 2019, “CCR5 Is a Therapeutic Target for Re-
covery after Stroke and Traumatic Brain Injury”, Cell, 21st February). However, with a press release issued 
on 26th November 2018, his scientific institution, the Southern University of Science and Technology in 
Shenzhen, China, declared itself unaware of the research: www.sustc.edu.cn/news_events_/5524
17 See neri, Demetrio, 2016, “Embryo editing: a proposito di una recente autorizzazione dell’HFEA”, 
Biolaw Journal, 2016, 1, pp. 261-269; MitaliPoV, Shoukrat et al., 2017, “Correction of a pathogenic gene 
mutation in human embryos”, Nature, 548, 24th August, pp. 413-419; Meldolesi, Anna, 2017, E l’uomo creò 
l’uomo. CRISPR e la rivoluzione dell’editing genomico, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin.
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If a genome has been strongly modified through gene editing, or even arti-
ficially synthesized18, genetic tests possibly will not show parental relations with 
no one. Therefore, we could even say that such a child has no genetic parents 
at all.
In these cases, legal or intentional parenthood will be not just an alternative 
option to be compared with genetic parenthood, but the only possible kind of 
available parenthood. Probably the law will have to ensure that people born from 
gene editing can have a responsible parent to protect their best interests: Proba-
bly he/she will be the person whose gametes were used to produce the embryo 
to be edited, or the one who commissioned the editing process.
Moreover, the law will have to rethink both the limits and possibilities of the 
preemptive determination of a person’s genome. With reference to preimplanta-
tion genetic diagnosis, which is already widespread, the issue is above all how 
to balance the right of the parents to select a healthy embryo with the right to life 
of the discarded embryos19. On the other hand, gene editing would not discard 
any embryo but “just” modify the imperfect genome of the concerned embryo.
Therefore, the problem would turn out to be quite different: We would have to 
balance the use of these techniques of genetic health predetermination with the 
proposed right of prospective children to an open future, or even to disability20.
18 At the moment, such a synthesis is possible only with regard to quite simple organisms: See craiG 
Venter, John et al., 2010, “Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome”, 
Science, 329, pp. 52-56; al-kHalili, Jim, J. McFadden, Johnjoe, Life on the Edge: The Coming of Age of 
Quantum Biology, Penguin, London, 2014; annaluru, Narayana et al., 2014, “Total Synthesis of a Function-
al Designer Eukaryotic Chromosome”, Science, 344, pp. 55-58; Harrison, Sarah et al., 2017, “Assembly 
of embryonic and extra-embryonic stem cells to mimic embryogenesis in vitro”, Science, 356, 2nd March, 
doi:10.1126/science.aal1810; Richardson, Sarah et al., 2017, “Design of a synthetic yeast genome”, Sci-
ence, 355, pp. 1040-1044; danelon, Cristophe et al., 2018, “Self-replication of DNA by its encoded pro-
teins in liposome-based synthetic cells”, Nature Communications, 20th April.
19 In this regard we can consider the peculiar case of the recent Italian legislation. In the very restrictive 
regulation of assisted reproductive technologies of 2004 (Act 40 of 19th February 2004) the Italian legislators 
prohibited any kind of embryo selection, but the Constitutional Court in its decision of 14th May 2015, n. 96, 
affirmed the right of prospective parents to accede preimplantation genetic diagnosis in order to avoid the 
transmission of severe diseases. See also, for further references, Rizzuti, Marco, 2017, “Il problema della 
diagnosi preimpianto”, Diritto e Salute, 3, pp. 65-76.
20 See daVis, Dena, 1997, “Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future”, The Hastings 
Center Report, 27, 2, pp. 7-15; Benston, Shawna, 2016, “CRISPR, a Crossroads in Genetic Intervention: 
Pitting the Right to Health against the Right to Disability”, Laws, doi:10.3390/laws5010005.
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4. Mitochondrial Donation: Children with Three Genetic Parents
On the other hand, genetic parents can be more than two21.
Mitochondrial donation is the replacement of the mitochondria located within 
the oocyte of a woman with those of another woman, in order to prevent the 
transmission to the child of genetic diseases linked to mitochondrial DNA. So, 
the child has three genetic parents: The woman who has given the oocyte and its 
nuclear DNA, the other woman who has given only the mitochondrial DNA, and a 
man whose semen has fertilized such a peculiar oocyte. Mitochondrial donation 
is already practised: The first “3-parents baby” was born in 2016 in Mexico22.
The United Kingdom has been the first country to enact a specific regulation 
in this regard in 2015, and these rules recognize as mother only the woman who 
gave the nuclear DNA23. Therefore, the genetic parents are three, but the legal 
parents are still the traditional two. However, of course, this is just one of the 
possible options.
Some years before, precisely an English judge, Lord Thorpe, had written 
that: “It is generally accepted that a child gains by having two parents. It does 
not follow from that that the addition of a third is necessarily disadvantageous”24. 
The trial dealt with the relationships among a lesbian couple, a male gamete 
donor and their child. But in the future a similar reasoning may be applied also 
21 In this section we will focus on mitochondrial donations, but another way to procreate children with 
more than two genetic parents could be the artificial production of tetragametic chimeric embryos (we have 
already discussed natural chimerism), a technique that, however, at the moment has not been used for 
reproductive purposes.
22 See HaMZelou, Jessica, 2016, “Exclusive: World’s first baby born with new ‘3 parent’ technique”, The 
New Scientist, 27th September. After that, other births from mitochondrial donations have been reported 
both in Ukraine and in the United Kingdom (see HaMZelou, Jessica, 2018, “First UK three-parent babies 
could be born this year”, The New Scientist, 2nd February).
23 We refer to the Human Fertilization and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations, Statutory 
instrument 2015 No. 572. See wrinGley, Anthony et al., 2015, “Mitochondrial replacement: ethics and 
identity”, Bioethics, 9, pp 631-638; Balistreri, Maurizio, 2015, “In merito alle procedure che permettono di 
correggere le anomalie mitocondriali del nascituro: questioni etiche e prospettive giuridiche”, Biolaw Jour-
nal, 2, pp. 61-79; Mclean, Sheila, 2015, “Mitochondrial DNA Transfer. Some Reflections from the United 
Kingdom”, Biolaw Journal, 2, p. 81 et seq.; Brandt, Reuven, 2016, “Mitochondrial donation and ‘the right to 
know’”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 42, pp. 678-684; VV. AA., 2017, “Special Issue: The Ethics of Mitochon-
drial Replacement”, Bioethics, 1, pp. 1-69; rulli, Tina, 2017, “The Mitochondrial Replacement ‘Therapy’ 
Myth”, Bioethics, 5, pp. 368-374; Brandt, Reuven, 2018, “Mandatory sex selection and mitochondrial 
transfer”, Bioethics, 7, pp. 437-444.
24 The quote is from A. vs. B. and C. [2012] EWCA Civ 285. See ZanGHellini, Aleardo, 2012, “Heteronor-
mativity, Poly-Parenting, and the Homo-Nuclear Family”, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 4, pp. 475-486; 
GianneccHini, Ilaria, 2018, “La genitorialità delle coppie omosessuali nell’ordinamento inglese: diritti e doveri 
secondo la legge e la common law dopo lo Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990-2008”, GenIUS. 
Rivista di studi giuridici sull’orientamento sessuale e l’identità di genere, 1, p. 101 et seq.
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to mitochondrial donations, in order to recognize both women as mothers. Such 
a demand could come from a lesbian couple again, but also from other family 
models involving more than a woman, such as polygamy or polyamory25. There-
fore, a child would turn out to have three legal parents as well as three genetic 
parents.
5. Artificial Gametogenesis: Children with Same-Sex Genetic 
Parents
However, also same-sex parenting itself could be changed by genetic 
manipulations.
Artificial gametogenesis is the production of gametes from stem cells de-
rived from normal somatic cells (e.g., skin cells) induced to go back to pluripo-
tency: It has been already tested in mice26. In humans27 such a technique will 
make assisted reproduction easier: each one will produce his/her own gametes 
without the need of donations nor the risks related to the retrieval of oocytes28. 
25 Polygamy, and more specifically polygyny, is today legally practiced in many countries, mostly but not 
only of Islamic culture, and has been discussed by Western legal scholars mainly with regard to migration 
issues (see, e.g., Bourdelois, Beatrice, 1993, Mariage polygamique et droit positif français, GLN Joly Edi-
tions, Paris; Lines, Greggary, 2016, “Polymmigration: Immigration Implications and Possibilities Post Brown 
v. Buhman”, Arizona Law Review, 58, pp. 477-510; riZZuti, Marco, 2016, Il problema dei rapporti familiari 
poligamici. Precedenti storici e attualità della questione, E.S.I., Naples) while polyamory could represent 
a domestic, and liberal as well as equalitarian, way to plural families (see anaPol, Deborah, 1992, Love 
Without Limits. The Quest for Sustainable Intimate Relationships. Responsible Nonmonogamy, IntiNet Re-
source Center, San Rafael, California; eMens, Elizabeth, 2004, “Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy 
and Polyamorous Existence”, New York University Review of Law & Social Change, 29, p. 277 et seq.; 
Grande, Elisabetta, Pes, Luca, 2018, Più cuori e una capanna. Il poliamore come istituzione, Giappichelli, 
Turin).
26 See HayasHi, Katsuhiko et al., 2016, “Reconstitution in vitro of the entire cycle of the mouse female 
germ line”, Nature, 539, 17th October, pp. 299-303. An alternative way to the production of artificial gam-
etes could be the hypothesized use of artificial ovaries (see sHaH, Ramille et al., 2017, “A bioprosthetic 
ovary created using 3D printed microporous scaffolds restores ovarian function in sterilized mice”, Nature 
Communications, 16th May; telFer, Evelyn et al., 2018, “Metaphase II oocytes from human unilaminar folli-
cles grown in a multistep culture system”, Molecular Human Reproduction, 3, pp. 135-142; scutti, Susan, 
2018, “Artificial ovary could help young cancer patients preserve fertility”, www.cnn.com, 1st July).
27 See yaMasHiro, Chika et al., 2018, “Generation of human oogonia from induced pluripotent stem cells 
in vitro”, Science, 19th October.
28 See Greely, Henry, 2016, The End of Sex and the Future of Human Reproduction, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts; carter-walsHaw, Sarah, 2018, “In vitro gametogenesis: The end of egg 
donation?”, Bioethics, 1st 23rd August, https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12499; seGers, Seppe et al., 2019, “In 
vitro gametogenesis and reproductive cloning: Can we allow one while banning the other?”, Bioethics, 33, 
pp. 68-75.
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But, through artificial gametogenesis, maybe a man could also produce fe-
male gametes, or a woman could produce male gametes29, in order to fertilize 
his/her same-sex partner30, or even to fertilize him/herself31.
These developments may impact on the legal debate about same-sex par-
enthood. Today is generally accepted that each partner of a same-sex couple 
is entitled to parental rights with regard to his/her own genetic child32. In many 
countries the very debated issue is the position of the other partner with regard 
to the child: Step-parent? Merely social parent? No parent at all?
Therefore, probably, if artificial gametogenesis will allow same-sex partners 
to be both genetic parents of the same child, the recognition of both as legal 
parents too will become easier.
6. Concluding Remarks
Probably, as already happened in ancient times with the introduction of mo-
nogamy and in recent times with genetic tests, also the discussed developments 
will reshape again the legal concepts of parenthood. But in which directions? We 
can hypothesize different, and even contradictory, possible trends.
On one hand, new techniques will prompt the legal orders to recognize new 
kinds of genetic parenthood, unconceivable in the past, such as the third ge-
netic parent or the same-sex two genetic parents. Therefore, the role of genet-
ics in defining parenthood will be strongly stressed, even more than in the last 
decades.
29 Even this application of the discussed technique has been already tested in mice (see ZHou, Qi et al., 
2018, “Generation of Bimaternal and Bipaternal Mice from Hypomethylated Haploid ESCs with Imprinting 
Region Deletions”, Cell Stem Cell, 11th October).
30 See MarGalit, Yehezkel et al., 2014, “The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology: 
Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood”, Harvard Journal of Law & Gender, pp. 107-139; Suter, Sonia, 
2016, “In vitro gametogenesis: just another way to have a baby?”, Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 1, 
pp. 87-119; Brummett, Abram, 2018, “Conscience claims, metaphysics, and avoiding an LGBT eugenic”, 
Bioethics, 23rd April, https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12430; adVena-reGnery, Barbara et al., 2018, “Framing 
the ethical and legal issues of human artificial gametes in research, therapy, and assisted reproduction: 
A German perspective”, Bioethics, 22nd May, doi: 10.1111/bioe.12433.
31 For the purposes of the procreation of children with one genetic parent, this kind of self-fertilization 
could turn out to be an alternative to the production of an embryo from the stem cells of another single em-
bryo (see riVron, Nicolas et al., 2018, “Blastocyst-like structures generated solely from stem cells”, Nature, 
2nd May), or to the already discussed technique of parthenogenesis.
32 In the European context at least since the important decision of the European Court of Human Rights, 
21st December 1999, n. 33290/96, Salgueiro da Silva Mouta vs. Portugal, when the mentioned Court con-
sidered as a violation of article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights the decision of Portuguese 
judges who had denied a man the right of contact with his daughter, awarding custody to the mother, 
because of his homosexuality.
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But, on the other hand, with regard to the hypotheses of children without 
genetic parents or with just one genetic parent, the new developments will re-
inforce a different trend towards the necessity of recurring to intentional and/or 
social criteria in defining parenthood.
Moreover, and again in analogy with the mentioned remote and recent 
historical developments, the forthcoming ones will impact also the relations 
between the sexes, given that some of the discussed techniques, such as par-
thenogenesis or artificial gametogenesis, could even lead to a sort of reproduc- 
tive self-sufficiency of the female one.
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